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Afghans are hardworking and 
enterprising, making excellent entrepreneurs; 
indeed, there are many success stories among 
Afghan businessmen. Given the right support, 
most Afghans would be able to contribute 
positively during their stay in Pakistan. 
The recent decision by the Government of 
Pakistan to allow Afghan refugees to open 
bank accounts is a positive step towards 
their financial inclusion and protection, but 
more such steps are needed to ensure urban 
refugees have access to some of the very basic 
services like health, education, trade and 
business. The current refugee management 
framework needs to be reviewed, and 
Pakistan should consider adopting a 
national refugee law, which would enable 
the different authorities to more effectively 
manage urban refugees. While granting 
citizenship to Afghan refugees may still be a 
long way off, efforts should be made to enable 
refugees to live comfortable, dignified lives. 
Muhammad Abbas Khan comisb@hotmail.com  
Commissioner, Commissionerate for Afghan 
Refugees, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
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Contested public authority in marginal urban areas: 
challenges for humanitarians
Dolf J H te Lintelo, Hart Ford, Tim Liptrot, Wissam Mansour and Aline Rahbany 
In urban contexts where multiple governance actors compete for authority, a clearer 
approach is needed on whether and how to engage these various actors in order to reach the 
most vulnerable host and refugee populations. 
When Syrians fleeing civil war began to 
seek refuge in Jordan and Lebanon in 2011, 
initial relief efforts by the international 
humanitarian community focused 
on supporting national governments. 
However, in recognition of the vital role that 
municipalities play in providing support 
and services, over the last five years there 
has been a strong shift in the international 
community towards supporting them, as 
part of a broader localisation agenda.
The search for low-cost multi-occupancy 
housing has driven large numbers of Syrians 
into informal urban settlements where 
the most vulnerable host communities, 
economic migrants and refugee populations 
live. Such neighbourhoods, which include 
official Palestinian camps and unofficial 
‘gatherings’, have urbanised yet have typically 
been subject to historic neglect: municipal 
authorities have not operated here, or have 
had only limited presence. Globally, analyses 
show that in the absence of active municipal 
governance – and particularly in marginal 
conflict-affected or post-conflict urban settings 
– other mediators emerge in the poorest urban 
areas. These actors include traditional leaders, 
tribal networks, influential individuals, 
criminal gangs, labour brokers, militias, 
faith-based groups and local committees. 
Our research,1 which included 
consultations with the Global Alliance 
for Urban Crises and with humanitarian 
and development actors in Lebanon and 
Jordan, suggests that the localisation agenda 
currently fails to take proper account of 
such influential local governance actors. 
Ignoring their critical role in the de facto 
governance of the most marginalised urban 
areas impedes humanitarians’ ability 
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to broker support for highly vulnerable 
populations living in these areas. 
Shifting focus onto municipalities 
Donors are increasingly directing support 
towards urban municipalities and mayors 
in order to strengthen local capacity. In 
Jordan, the 2015 Decentralisation Act has 
given municipal authorities new mandates 
and powers. This has led to competition 
for authority between national Members 
of Parliament and municipal actors and 
provided new ways for tribal networks 
to exert influence over State workings. 
Simultaneously, as aid resources shift towards 
supporting municipalities, local community-
based organisations now face much tougher 
competition for funding and survival. 
In Lebanon, the expanded mandates of 
municipal authorities have not been matched 
by adequate financial and administrative 
capacity, and decisions and actors at 
governorate or central levels can thwart 
municipalities’ abilities to act; this can 
create space for non-State actors to step in. 
Typically, non-citizens, including 
migrants, stateless people and refugees, are 
not politically represented in municipalities. 
Furthermore, urban municipalities neither 
politically represent nor are accountable 
to large proportions of Lebanese residents, 
who are registered to vote in their native 
villages. This disenfranchisement endures, 
given long terms in office (six years) and 
the fact that parties’ control over municipal 
councils typically lasts over multiple terms. 
Similarly, in Jordan, some tribes (such as 
in the city of Ma’an) pre-select candidates 
for municipal elections from among their 
members, in turn preventing non-members 
from standing for office. This is detrimental 
to wider representation and accountability. 
Whereas the Jordanian State has been 
supporting the upgrading of informal urban 
settlements for many years, many Lebanese 
municipalities refrain from servicing 
informal areas for fear of legitimising their 
existence and of violating the law that forbids 
municipalities from providing services to 
such neighbourhoods. Yet in some areas 
governing actors have found ways to improve 
the condition of informal settlements. After 
Israeli bombardments in 2006, the Hezbollah 
resistance movement and political party led 
a successful ‘build back better’ campaign in 
Ghobeiry municipality in Beirut. Elsewhere, 
in Sour, one of Lebanon’s larger cities, the 
municipality has institutionalised practices 
that enable Lebanese residents – but not 
stateless Palestinian inhabitants – to 
circumvent the usual requirement for 
building licenses to improve housing 
infrastructure in informal areas. But as 
non-State actors step into the vacuum left 
by municipalities’ lack of engagement 
in marginalised areas in Lebanon, it 
is unclear whether and through what 
mechanisms they can be held accountable. 
Programming in low-income urban settings 
in Jordan and Lebanon 
The humanitarian principles of humanity, 
neutrality, impartiality and independence 
in theory provide for international actors 
to work with all actors at the city or 
neighbourhood level, including State and 
non-State, formal and informal actors. 
However, humanitarian interventions can 
compromise the principles of neutrality and 
impartiality if/when they inadvertently or 
intentionally support or deny the legitimacy 
of local actors who seek to exercise authority. 
Municipalities often insist that 
humanitarian actors seek permission 
to access hard-to-reach communities. 
Interventions, therefore, can be viewed as 
being approved by – or even extending – 
the municipality’s authority. Municipal 
endorsement, however, is not always enough 
to enable humanitarian and development 
programming. In environments where 
access to health, education, water and other 
services is not a question of rights but often 
bestowed by patronage, non-State authorities 
also seek to broker aid for vulnerable 
populations to legitimate their claim to 
authority. In Lebanon, non-State actors (as 
well as central government authorities) are 
known to stop interventions – despite prior 
municipal endorsement – for security and 
other reasons. Populations may distrust 
absent municipal authorities, while non-
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State actors that provide important security, 
welfare and conflict resolution services may 
be seen as having significant legitimacy. 
Donors also play a significant role 
in shaping the ability to operate in areas 
controlled by urban non-State actors. They 
may, for example, deem tribal authorities 
to be insufficiently inclusive of women, 
refugees and other less-represented groups. 
Interventions often focus on separating 
municipal governance from tribal influence. 
Donors provide incentives and assistance to 
municipal actors to help them develop sources 
of legitimacy that are not linked to or depend 
on tribal identity, including their performance 
and how they conduct consultations and 
elections. They also support new, non-
tribal organisations, whose sustainability 
and local legitimacy remain unproven. 
In Lebanon, Hezbollah holds elected 
State offices (from municipal council to 
parliament) and governs large swathes of 
impoverished urban areas. Yet it is considered 
a terrorist organisation, and proscribed, 
by several Western countries including 
the US, UK, Canada and the Netherlands. 
This proscription severely constrains 
humanitarian programming and challenges 
humanitarian principles. The party itself 
also scrutinises and permits – or not – 
prospective aid programmes to take place. 
Implementing partners face the dilemma 
of navigating diverse donor restrictions on the 
one hand, and respecting the democratically 
elected office of mayors, municipal 
councillors, parliamentarians and ministerial 
offices on the other. Ignoring some political 
parties who govern specific urban areas, while 
supporting others, may make it impossible 
to develop municipal capacities without also 
unjustifiably punishing people living in these 
areas, who may or may not be supportive 
of the party in control. Aid distribution 
may also disrupt a fragile balance of power 
between political parties and thereby 
undermine efforts to maintain stability. 
Creating wider, more principled 
engagement with non-State urban actors
Humanitarian actions in urban contexts 
inevitably encounter local struggles for power 
and authority, and may be used as a means 
of legitimising authority. With this in mind, 
we identify five key recommendations for 
designing and implementing humanitarian 
and development interventions in 
complex, low-income urban areas:
	 Establish strong context analysis for 
effective programme design. This needs 
to be done at local area or neighbourhood 
level and include stakeholder mapping, 
analysis and simultaneous equal 
engagement with State and non-State 
actors to build productive relationships 
ahead of programmatic interventions. 
Critically, analysis should not overstate 
the division between formal and informal 
actors. 
	 Communicate with communities to build 
meaningful consensus on programme 
objectives before a programme starts. 
This is time-consuming and resource-
intensive yet critical. The order in which 
stakeholders are engaged is also important 
and can close doors later if one makes a 
misstep early on. 
	 Foster greater dialogue between 
implementing partners and donors. This 
is necessary in order to understand how to 
sensitively deal with multiple competing 
authorities, and to learn from experience. 
Donors could offer more practical guidance 
on how to operate with non-State public 
authorities that are deemed to exclude 
certain groups, and provide greater clarity 
on ‘red lines’ in the case of proscription 
policies. Moreover, aid agencies should 
be encouraged to give feedback to donors 
about operational realities in trying to 
reach complex, high-need areas.
	 Place greater emphasis on the role of the 
UN Humanitarian Coordinator. Doing so 
could assist with negotiating access with 
local public authorities, in line with the 
Lebanon Crisis Response Plan or other 
response frameworks. This should aim to 
ensure that ‘hard-to-reach areas’ are still 
receiving a wide array of support. 
	 Support primary data collection. There 
is an acute need to fill gaps in existing 
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literature by conducting substantial 
primary data collection. This would help 
to generate deeper knowledge of the 
impact of humanitarian and development 
interventions on the legitimacy of State and 
non-State actors governing low-income 
informal urban settings. 
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Places of refuge and risk: lessons from San Pedro Sula
Yolanda Zapata
The outcome of interventions in San Pedro Sula, Honduras, provides lessons for working in 
high-risk urban neighbourhoods and communities.
The actions of gangs and organised crime 
linked to international drug trafficking, in 
addtion to the harsh response of State security 
forces, have driven the surge in violence in 
Honduras and San Pedro Sula’s identification 
a few years ago as the most violent city in the 
world (because of its high rate of homicides). 
Just over half of the population of Honduras 
is concentrated in urban areas, including 
San Pedro Sula whose metropolitan area has 
a population of approximately 2.5 million 
people. In 2015, it was estimated that gang 
members were present in more than 50 
neighbourhoods in San Pedro Sula, mainly 
those that are poorest and most marginalised.1 
Today, in addition to the two main gangs 
(the Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio 18), the 
influence of other local gangs and organised 
criminal groups is also evident. For example, 
in Rivera Hernández, a marginalised area 
of the city with an estimated population of 
120,000, invisible borders divide the territory 
into streets and neighbourhoods that are 
controlled by more than six groups. 
Between 2004 and 2014, the metropolitan 
area of  San Pedro Sula hosted more than 
40% of the country’s internally displaced 
people (IDPs), with the city itself hosting 
21.5%.2 Data reveal the intra-urban nature 
of forced displacement, showing that 81% of 
San Pedro Sula’s IDPs had been displaced 
from elsewhere in the city. Although 
displacement affects many communities 
and neighbourhoods, most places to which 
people are displaced are those where gangs 
exercise social and territorial control and/
or have some level of influence. Although 
in this context displacement is not as visible 
because individuals or families may be 
forced to take precautionary measures 
and abandon their homes in silence, and 
few look to the authorities for protection, 
evidence shows that these neighbourhoods 
are generally in the most marginalised or 
lower-middle class areas of the city and 
are characterised by limited access to basic 
rights and public services, and by high 
levels of violence, including homicide.3 
The city offers a certain anonymity 
and the possibility to maintain family and 
personal networks and access services 
and employment. Seeking protection in 
